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Abstract
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response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, as
well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path.
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1 Introduction
Cournot ta^tonnement is the oldest and one of the most natural dynamic scenarios of individual myopic
adaptation in strategic games. It has been studied in various contexts and from various viewpoints,
see, e.g., Topkis (1979), Bernheim (1984), Moulin (1984), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
Kandori and Rob (1995), and Milchtaich (1996).
The introduction of the concept of a potential game by Monderer and Shapley (1996) stimulated
studies of similarities and dissimilarities between better and best response dynamics. Since Monderer
and Shapley paid most attention to the cardinal concept of an exact potential, they dened every
kind of a potential as a real-valued function. When Voorneveld (2000) introduced a \best-response
potential," he followed their lead. For a nite game, the restriction to numeric potentials is innocuous;
in the general case, it is not so. And yet, nobody has demonstrated so far that the possibility of a
numeric representation has anything to do with improvement dynamics.
Voorneveld's denition is over-exacting in another respect too, viz. it followed Monderer and Shap-
ley's concept of an ordinal potential rather than a generalized ordinal one. Meanwhile, Monderer and
Shapley (1996, Lemma 2.5) showed that it is the latter kind of a potential that is most relevant to the
convergence of adaptive dynamics. Kukushkin (2004, Section 6) dened a \Cournot potential" as a
partial order on the set of strategy proles with respect to which every best response improvement by
a single player pushes the current strategy prole upwards. In a nite game, the existence of such an
order is equivalent to the \nite best response property" (Milchtaich, 1996). Naturally, Voorneveld's
potential always denes a Cournot potential; the converse is generally wrong, even in a nite game
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996, the example on p. 129).
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When attention is turned to innite games, the acyclicity of (either better or best response) im-
provements does not imply even the existence of a Nash equilibrium, to say nothing of the convergence
of adaptive dynamics. Nonetheless, the main theorem of Kukushkin (2011) showed that in a game
with compact strategy sets and \continuous enough" preferences, the acyclicity of all individual im-
provements ensures the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium and the possibility to reach it
(perhaps, approximately) with a unilateral improvement path. The acyclicity of only the best response
improvements, however, does not ensure even the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium, even in a
compact-continuous two-person game (Kukushkin, 2011, Example 1).
In this paper, we assume that the strategy sets are compact metric spaces, and study what topolog-
ical conditions should be added to the denition of a Cournot potential in order to ensure the existence
of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium or, additionally, the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in
the limit (or as a cluster point) of a best response improvement path. Roughly speaking, we consider
two such additional requirements: !-transitivity, and !-transitivity plus lower semicontinuity. The
rst ensures the existence of an equilibrium (as well as \transnite convergence" to equilibria of all
best response improvement paths). The second, the possibility to reach the set of Nash equilibria in
the limit of a best response improvement path { an innitary version of the weak FBRP (Milchtaich,
1996) { and convergence to the set of Nash equilibria of all best response improvement paths in the
case of two players.
We do not require the utility functions to be continuous, only assume that the best responses
exist everywhere; a well-known sucient condition for this is the upper semicontinuity of each utility
function in own choice. Quite often, the upper hemicontinuity of the best response correspondences
also helps; a sucient condition for that is the upper semicontinuity of each utility function in the
total strategy prole and continuity in the choices of others.
While the acyclicity of best response improvements can be shown by reductio ad absurdum, as in
Theorem 2 of Kandori and Rob (1995) or Theorem 1 of Kukushkin (2004), it is dicult to imagine
how the existence of, say, a continuous Cournot potential could be established without producing one
explicitly. Fortunately, there are natural classes of strategic games where this is possible; two of them
are briey described in this paper. In the rst example, \games with structured utilities," there is even
an exact (at least, an ordinal) potential as dened by Monderer and Shapley (1996), hence the behavior
of all individual improvement paths is rather regular. In the second, \aggregative games," arbitrary
improvements may lead nowhere. Sequential Cournot ta^tonnement in such games was considered by
Jensen (2010), but his results are not directly comparable to ours, see Section 9.5.
In Section 2, the basic denitions are given. Section 3 contains the main \positive" results; Section 4,
additional \positive" results which assume the uniqueness of the best responses. In Section 5, we
introduce two weaker notions of a potential, which broaden the scope of applications. Sections 6 and 7
present known classes of games where the assumptions of (some of) our theorems are satised. Section 8
contains \negative" results, showing the impossibility of easy generalizations. A discussion of various
related questions in Section 9 concludes the paper.
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2 Preliminaries
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal utilities. It is dened by a nite set of players N , and
strategy sets Xi and ordinal utility functions ui : XN ! R, where XN =
Q
i2N Xi, for all i 2 N . We
denote X i =
Q
j2NnfigXj for each i 2 N . Given a strategy prole xN 2 XN and i 2 N , we denote
xi and x i its projections to Xi and X i, respectively; a pair (xi; x i) uniquely determines xN . In the
case of #N = 2, we denote  i the partner/rival of player i.
Dening the best response correspondence Ri : X i ! 2Xi for each i 2 N in the usual way,
Ri(x i) := Argmax
xi2Xi
ui(xi; x i)
for every x i 2 X i, we introduce the best response improvement relation onXN (i 2 N , yN ; xN 2 XN ):
yN BBRi xN 
 [y i = x i & xi =2 Ri(x i) 3 yi]; (1a)
yN BBR xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BBRi xN ]: (1b)
Every Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of BBR. If Ri(x i) 6= ; for all i 2 N and x i 2 X i, then every
maximizer of BBR is a Nash equilibrium.
A Cournot path is a nite or innite sequence hxkN ik=0;1;::: such that xk+1N BBR xkN whenever k  0
and xk+1N is dened. A Cournot potential is an irreexive and transitive binary relation  on XN such
that
8xN ; yN 2 XN

yN BBR xN ) yN  xN

: (2)
The existence of a Cournot potential is equivalent to the absence of Cournot cycles, i.e., Cournot
paths hx0N ; x1N ; : : : ; xmN i such that m > 0 and x0N = xmN . If the game is nite, this fact implies that
every Cournot path, if continued whenever possible, reaches a Nash equilibrium in a nite number of
steps. Example 1 from Kukushkin (2011) shows that a compact-continuous game may admit a Cournot
potential and still possess no Nash equilibrium, to say nothing of the convergence of Cournot paths.
Henceforth, we assume that each Xi is a compact metric space and endow XN with, say, the maxi-
mum metric. We do not impose any explicit continuity-style restriction on the utilities; all assumptions
are formulated in terms of the best response correspondences. In particular, we assume throughout
that Ri(x i) 6= ; for every i 2 N and x i 2 X i. The upper semicontinuity of ui in own choice xi is
sucient for that though by no means necessary. In many results, we assume that each Ri is upper
hemicontinuous. A sucient condition for that is the upper semicontinuity of ui in xN and continuity
in x i.
Let  be a binary relation on a metric space X. An improvement path of  is a (nite or innite)
sequence hxkik in X such that xk+1  xk whenever xk+1 is dened. Clearly,  is a Cournot potential
if and only if every Cournot path is an improvement path of .
A binary relation on a metric spaceX is called !-transitive if it is transitive and x!  x0 whenever
an improvement path hxkik2N of  in X converges to x! 2 X. A relation  is upper semicontinuous
if all its lower contour sets, fx 2 X j y  xg (y 2 X), are open; dually,  is lower semicontinuous
if all its upper contour sets, fy 2 X j y  xg (x 2 X), are open. A relation  is continuous if its
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\graph," f(x; y) 2 X2 j y  xg, is open. Clearly, every continuous relation is both upper and lower
semicontinuous. An upper semicontinuous relation need not be !-transitive, even if it is transitive;
however, an upper semicontinuous Cournot potential can always be extended to an !-transitive one.
It turns out that two properties of a Cournot potential are most relevant for the questions we
address here: !-transitivity and the conjunction of !-transitivity and lower semicontinuity. These two
simple statements are helpful in the following.
Lemma 2.1. Let  be an !-transitive binary relation on a metric space X. Let x! 2 X be a cluster
point of an innite improvement path hxkik2N of . Then x!  xk for all k 2 N.
Proof. By the transitivity of , we have xh  xk whenever h > k. Since x! is a cluster point, there
is a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkh ! x!. Since hxkhih>h for each h 2 N is also an
improvement path of  converging to x!, we have x!  xkh for all h 2 N by !-transitivity. For every
other k 2 N, there is h 2 N such that kh > k, and hence x!  xkh  xk.
Lemma 2.2. Let   be a strategic game where each Xi is a compact metric space. Let   admit
an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Let hxkN ik2N be an innite
Cournot path and X!  XN be the set of its cluster points. Then
8y!N ; x!N 2 X!

y!N 6 x!N

: (3)
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, we have x!N  xkN for each k 2 N. If we supposed that y!N  x!N , we would have
xkN  x!N whenever xkN is close enough to y!N by the lower semicontinuity, i.e., a contradiction.
A (nite or innite) sequence hxkN ik=0;1;::: in XN converges to a subset Y  XN if either it is nite
and ends at xmN 2 Y or it is innite and all its cluster points belong to Y .
3 Main theorems
Theorem 3.1. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space. Let   admit an !-tran-
sitive Cournot potential. Then   possesses a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008), there exists a maximizer x0N of the potential  on XN .
By (2), x0N is also a maximizer of BBR on XN , i.e., a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. Let   be a strategic game where #N = 2, each Xi is a compact metric space, and
each Ri is upper hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive Cournot potential . Let hxkN ik2N be
an innite Cournot path. Then there is a Nash equilibrium among cluster points of the path.
Proof. We denote X!  XN the set of cluster points of hxkN ik2N and pick a maximizer x!N of  on X!;
it exists by Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) since X! is compact. As in the proof of Lemma 2.1,
we pick a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN ! x!N . Since N is nite, we may, without
restricting generality, assume that xkhi 2 Ri(xkh i) for an i 2 N and all h. Then we denote yhN := xkh+1N
(h 2 N); clearly, yhN BBR i xkhN , and hence xkhi = yhi and yh i 2 R i(xkhi ). Without restricting generality,
yhN ! y!N 2 X!; hence x!i = y!i and y! i 2 R i(x!i ) since R i is upper hemicontinuous. Now an
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assumption that x! i =2 R i(x!i ) would lead to y!N BBR i x!N and hence y!N  x!N by (2), contradicting
the choice of x!N . Thus, x
!
N is a Nash equilibrium indeed.
Remark. The assumption that each Ri is upper hemicontinuous cannot simply be dropped, see Ex-
ample 8.1 below. Example 8.5, due to Powell (1973), shows the same for the assumption #N = 2.
Lemma 3.3. Let a strategic game   satisfy all assumptions of Lemma 2.2, and let each Ri be upper
hemicontinuous. Let hxkN ik2N be an innite Cournot path, X!  XN be the set of its cluster points,
and x!N 2 X!. Then x!i 2 Ri(x! i) for at least two dierent players i 2 N .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we pick a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN !
x!N and denote y
h
N := x
kh+1
N (h 2 N). Without restricting generality, xkhi 2 Ri(xkh i) for an i 2 N
and all h, yhN ! y!N 2 X!, and yhN BBRj xkhN , hence yhj 2 Rj(yh j), for a j 2 N and all h. Note that
i 6= j since xkhj =2 Rj(xkh j), and that y! j = x! j . By the upper hemicontinuity of Ri and Rj , we have
x!i 2 Ri(x! i) and y!j 2 Ri(y! j). Finally, an assumption that x!j =2 Rj(x! j) would imply y!N BBR x!N ,
hence y!N  x!N by (2), contradicting (3).
Theorem 3.4. Let   be a strategic game where #N = 2, each Xi is a compact metric space, and
each Ri is upper hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower
semicontinuous. Then every Cournot path converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Immediately follows from Lemma 3.3.
Remark. All assumptions are essential here as Examples 8.1, 8.3, and 8.5 show.
Theorem 3.5. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space and each Ri be upper
hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous.
Then for every x0N 2 XN there exists a Cournot path starting at x0N and converging to the set of Nash
equilibria.
Proof. Given x0N 2 XN , we recursively dene a Cournot path hxkN ik. If xkN is a Nash equilibrium,
the process stops, and we are home. Otherwise, we dene N(k) := fi 2 N j xki =2 Ri(xk i)g and
X(k) :=
S
i2N(k)
 
Xi  fxk ig

; X(k) is compact. Then we pick a maximizer xk+1N = (x
k+1
i(k) ; x
k
 i(k))
of  on X(k). By (2), we have xk+1i(k) 2 R(xk i(k)), hence xk+1N BBR xkN , hence xk+1N  xkN .
Assuming the path innite, we denote X!  XN the set of its cluster points. Supposing, to the
contrary, that x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for x!N 2 X! and i 2 N , we pick a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N
such that xkhN ! x!N . Without restricting generality, xkhi =2 Ri(xkh i), and hence i 2 N(kh), for all h.
Then we pick yN 2 XN such that yN BBRi x!N and hence yN  x!N by (2). By the lower semicontinuity
of , we have (yi; xkh i)  x!N for all h large enough. By Lemma 2.1, (yi; xkh i)  xkN for such h and all
k; in particular, (yi; x
kh
 i)  xkh+1N for all h large enough. Since (yi; xkh i) 2 X(kh), this contradicts the
choice of xkh+1N .
Theorem 3.6. Let   be a strategic game where #N = 2 and each Xi is a compact metric space.
Let   admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Then for every
x0N 2 XN there exists a Cournot path starting at x0N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
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Proof. Given x0N 2 XN , we recursively dene a Cournot path hxkN ik in exactly the same way as in the
proof of Theorem 3.5. Assuming the path innite, we again denote X!  XN the set of its cluster
points.
Supposing, to the contrary, that x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for x!N 2 X! and i 2 N , we again pick a strictly
increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN ! x!N as well as yN 2 XN such that yN BBRi x!N and
hence yN  x!N  xkN for each k 2 N. Without restricting generality, we may assume that either
xkhi =2 Ri(xkh i) for all h, or xkh i =2 R i(xkhi ) for all h. In the rst case, we obtain a contradiction in
exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
In the second case, we notice that xkhN BBRi x
kh 1
N , hence i 2 N(kh   1), for each h. Since
xkh 1 i = x
kh
 i, we have (yi; x
kh 1
 i )  xkhN for all h 2 N large enough by the lower semicontinuity of ,
which contradicts the choice of xkhN since (yi; x
kh 1
 i ) 2 X(kh   1).
Remark. Example 8.2 shows that the assumption that each Ri is upper hemicontinuous in Theo-
rem 3.5, as well as the assumption #N = 2 in Theorem 3.6, cannot simply be dropped.
4 Unique best responses
It turns out that the uniqueness of the best responses allows us to dispense with the upper hemicontinu-
ity of Ri in almost all results of the preceding section, and also obtain a couple of new results without
analogs in a more general case. Throughout this section, we use the notation Ri(x i) = fri(x i)g
whenever the uniqueness is assumed or established.
Lemma 4.1. Let   be a strategic game where each Xi is a compact metric space. Let   admit an
!-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Let i 2 N and hxkN ik2N be such
that xkN ! x!N , #Ri(x! i) = 1, Ri(xk i) = fxki g and xk+1N  xkN for all k 2 N. Then Ri(x! i) = fx!i g.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: yi := ri(x
!
 i) 6= x!i . Then (yi; x! i) BBRi x!N ; hence (yi; x! i)  x!N . By
the lower semicontinuity of , we have (yi; xk i)  x!N  xkN for all k 2 N large enough. However,
the assumption xki = ri(x
k
 i) implies that x
k
i = yi or x
k
N BBRi (yi; xk i); therefore xkN = (yi; xk i) or
xkN  (yi; xk i).
Theorem 4.2. Let   be a strategic game where #N = 2 and each Xi is a compact metric space. Let
  admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Let hxkN ik2N be a
Cournot path and X!  XN be the set of its cluster points. Let #Ri(xk i) = 1 and #Ri(x! i) = 1 for
all i 2 N , k 2 N, and x!N 2 X!. Then hxkN ik2N converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.3. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space and let #Ri(x i) = 1
for all i 2 N and x i 2 X i. Let   admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower
semicontinuous. Then for every x0N 2 XN there exists a Cournot path starting at x0N and converging
to the set of Nash equilibria.
In both cases, the proofs virtually repeat those of Theorems 3.4 and 3.5, respectively, only references
to the upper hemicontinuity of Ri should be replaced with those to Lemma 4.1.
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We call a Cournot path hxkN ik inclusive if for each player i 2 N , there holds xki 2 Ri(xk i) for
some k. A Cournot path hxkN ik is totally inclusive if, whenever xmN is dened, the path hxkN ikm is
inclusive. Thus, a totally inclusive path either is innite or ends at a Nash equilibrium. We call an
innite Cournot path hxkN ik2N uniformly inclusive if there is a natural number m 2 N such that for
each i 2 N and each k 2 N, there is h 2 N such that k  h  k +m and xhi 2 Ri(xh i). Every innite
Cournot path generated by the sequential ta^tonnement process as dened by Moulin (1984, p. 87), see
also Jensen (2010, Theorem 2), is uniformly inclusive with m = #N   1.
Theorem 4.4. Let   be a strategic game where each Xi is a compact metric space. Let   admit an
!-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Let hxkN ik2N be a uniformly inclu-
sive Cournot path and X!  XN be the set of its cluster points. Let #Ri(xk i) = 1 and #Ri(x! i) = 1
for all i 2 N , k 2 N, and x!N 2 X!. Then hxkN ik2N converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let x!N 2 X!; we pick a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN ! x!N .
Claim 4.4.1. For each s 2 N, the sequence hxkh+sN ih converges to x!N .
Proof of Claim 4.4.1. We argue by induction in s. For s = 0, the denition of hkhih2N suces. The
general induction step is identical with the case of s = 1. Since XN is compact and N is nite, for
every subsequence hk0hih2N of hkhih2N, there are i 2 N and a subsequence hk00hih2N of hk0hih2N such that
x
k00h+1
N ! y!N 2 X! and x
k00h+1
N BBRi x
k00h
N . Then x
k00h+1
i = ri(x
k00h+1
 i ) and x
k00h+1
 i = x
k00h
 i for all h; hence,
y! i = x
!
 i and y
!
i = ri(y
!
 i) = ri(x
!
 i) by Lemma 4.1. An assumption that x
!
i 6= y!i would contradict
(3); hence y!N = x
!
N . Thus, x
!
N is the unique cluster point of hxkh+1N ih2N; therefore, xkh+1N ! x!N .
Let us x i 2 N . Since the path is uniformly inclusive, there is an s 2 f0; : : : ;mg for each h 2 N
such that xkh+si = ri(x
kh+s
 i ). By Claim 4.4.1, for every  > 0 there is h 2 N such that the distance
between xkh+sN and x
!
N is less than  for each s 2 f0; : : : ;mg and h > h. Therefore, there is a strictly
increasing sequence hk0hih2N such that x
k0h
N ! x!N and x
k0h
i = ri(x
k0h
 i). Now Lemma 4.1 is applicable,
implying x!i = ri(x
!
 i). Since i 2 N was arbitrary, x!N is a Nash equilibrium.
Remark. If #N = 2, then every innite Cournot path is uniformly inclusive (with m = 1); Theo-
rem 4.4 in this case becomes identical to Theorem 4.2. The reverse replacement of the uniqueness of
the best responses with their upper hemicontinuity in Theorem 4.4 would make it wrong (for #N > 2)
as Example 8.5 shows.
Theorem 4.5. Let   be a strategic game where #N = 3 and each Xi is a compact metric space. Let
  admit an !-transitive Cournot potential  which is also lower semicontinuous. Let hxkN ik2N be an
innite totally inclusive Cournot path and X!  XN be the set of its cluster points. Let #Ri(xk i) = 1
and #Ri(x! i) = 1 for all i 2 N , k 2 N, and x!N 2 X!. Then X! contains a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For each i 2 N , we denote X i the set of x!N 2 X! for which there exists a strictly increasing
sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN ! x!N and xkhi = ri(xkh i) for each h 2 N. By Lemma 4.1, x!i = ri(x! i)
for every x!N 2 X i. For each pair I  N , #I = 2, we denote XI :=
T
i2I X
i. Whenever I 6= J , XI\XJ
consists of Nash equilibria. By Lemma 3.3, modied as described after Lemma 4.1, X! =
S
I X
I . Since
the path is inclusive, X i 6= ; for each i 2 N ; hence at least two sets XI are nonempty too.
7
Assuming, to the contrary, that X! contains no Nash equilibrium, we must have XI \XJ = ; for
all pairs I 6= J . Since each XI is closed, there are open subsets V I such that XI  V I for each I and
V I \ V J = ; whenever I 6= J . Without restricting generality, we may assume that xkN 2
S
I V
I for
all k. Therefore, there exist I 6= J and a strictly increasing sequence hkhih2N such that xkhN 2 V J and
xkh+1N 2 V I for all h 2 N. Again without restricting generality, we may assume that xkh+1N BBRi xkhN
for all h and the same i 2 N while xkhN ! x!N 2 XJ and xkh+1N ! y!N 2 XI ; clearly, y! i = x! i. By
Lemma 4.1, y!i = ri(y
!
 i); hence i 2 I. Now if i =2 J , we have y!N BBRi x!N ; hence y!N  x!N by (2),
contradicting (3). If i 2 I \ J , we have x!i = ri(x! i), y!i = ri(y! i), and y! i = x! i; hence y!N = x!N ,
contradicting the assumption XI \XJ = ;.
Remark. Example 8.6 below shows that one could not assert that every x!N 2 X! in Theorem 4.5 is
a Nash equilibrium. Example 8.7, that even this theorem would be wrong for #N > 3.
5 Weaker concepts
To broaden the scope of applications, we introduce two weaker notions: a \partial Cournot potential"
and a \restricted Cournot potential." In the rst case, we require (2) to hold only for some pairs
xN ; yN 2 XN ; in the second, (2) is required to hold for \admissible" best responses only. Both weak-
enings can be combined, naturally, dening a \partial restricted Cournot potential." The implications
of the presence of a Cournot potential in a weaker sense are weaker too, but not very much.
We call a subset X0  XN BR-closed if it satises the following conditions.
1. If yN BBR xN and xN 2 X0, then yN 2 X0 too.
2. If hxkN ik2N is an innite Cournot path, x!N is its cluster point, and xkN 2 X0 for each k, then
x!N 2 X0.
We call an irreexive and transitive binary relation  on XN a partial Cournot potential if there is
a BR-closed subset ; 6= X0  XN such that (2) holds whenever xN 2 X0 (hence yN 2 X0 too).
Theorem 5.1. Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3, as well as Theorems 3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5 remain valid if
the \Cournot potential" in each of them is replaced with \partial Cournot potential" whereas every
Cournot path mentioned is contained in X0. In Lemma 4.1, the conditions that xkN 2 X0 for all k and
x!N 2 X0 should be added too.
A straightforward proof is omitted. Other results from Section 3 need a more careful treatment.
Theorem 5.2. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space. Let   admit an !-transi-
tive partial Cournot potential such that either X0 is closed, or the condition

[xN 2 X0 & yN  xN ])
yN 2 X0

holds. Then   possesses a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In the rst case, we invoke Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) exactly as in the proof of The-
orem 3.1. In the second case, we start with picking an xN 2 X0. If xN is a maximizer of  on XN ,
then it is a Nash equilibrium by (2). Otherwise, by the same Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008), there
is a maximizer yN of  on XN such that yN  xN . By our assumption, yN 2 X0 and hence is a Nash
equilibrium by (2) again.
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Remark. The additional restrictions onX0 in Theorem 5.2 could be dropped if we required Condition 2
in the denition of a BR-closed subset to hold for transnite Cournot paths as well.
To extend Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 to games with a partial Cournot potential, more serious modi-
cations are needed. First, we call a subset X0  XN BR-accessible if a nite Cournot path ending
in X0 can be started from every strategy prole in XN . Generally, a BR-closed subset need not be
BR-accessible; therefore, we virtually have to add such an assumption. Even after that, more assump-
tions are needed. We provide three dierent sets of such additions. In each case, the proof follows the
same scheme as that of Theorem 3.5, but with some modications in the construction of the \right"
Cournot path and in how the nal contradiction is obtained.
The following assumption is the most complicated when looked at, but the most convenient to
apply:
8xN ; zN 2 X0 8i 2 N 8yi 2 Xi

[xi 2 Ri(x i) & (yi; x i)  zN ]) xN  zN

: (4)
The condition may look intolerably articial, but it is satised, e.g., if  can be represented by
a function P : XN ! R in the sense that yN  xN () P (yN ) > P (xN ), and if Ri(x i) 
Argmaxyi2Xi P (yi; x i) whenever xN 2 X0.
Theorem 5.3. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space and each Ri be upper
hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential 
with a BR-accessible subset X0  XN such that the condition (4) holds. Then for every xN 2 XN
there exists a Cournot path starting at xN and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given xN 2 XN , we start with a nite Cournot path ending in X0. Once there, we recursively
dene a Cournot path hxkN ik in X0. Having xkN 2 X0, we dene N(k) := fi 2 N j xki =2 Ri(xk i)g
and X(k) :=
S
i2N(k)
 Ri(xk i)fxk ig. If N(k) = ;, xkN is a Nash equilibrium, and we are already
home. Otherwise, X(k) is compact and X(k)  X0 since the latter is BR-closed. Then we pick a
maximizer xk+1N = (x
k+1
i(k) ; x
k
 i(k)) of  on X(k). By denition, we have xk+1i(k) 2 Ri(k)(xk i(k)), hence
xk+1N BBR xkN , hence x
k+1
N 2 X0 and xk+1N  xkN .
Supposing, to the contrary, that x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for a cluster point of the path, we pick yN 2 XN
such that yN BBRi x!N ; hence yN  x!N by (2). Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, we have
(yi; x
kh
 i)  x!N and hence (yi; xkh i)  xkh+1N . If yi 2 Ri(xkh i), we immediately have a contradiction with
the choice of xkh+1N . Otherwise, we pick a zi 2 Ri(xkh i) and obtain the same contradiction, applying
(4) with xN := (zi; x
kh
 i) [2 X(kh)], yi as is, and zN := xkh+1N .
Theorem 5.4. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space and each Ri be upper
hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential 
with a BR-accessible subset X0 =
Q
i2N X
0
i  XN . Then for every xN 2 XN there exists a Cournot
path starting at xN and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 5.3, we start with a nite Cournot path ending in X0, and
then recursively dene a Cournot path hxkN ik in X0, picking a maximizer xk+1N = (xk+1i(k) ; xk i(k)) of 
on X(k) :=
S
i2N(k)
 Ri(xk i) fxk ig; clearly, xk+1N 2 X0 and xk+1N  xkN .
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Supposing, to the contrary, that x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for a cluster point of the path, we pick yN 2 XN such
that yN BBRi x!N ; hence yN 2 X0 since X0 is BR-absorbing; hence yi 2 X0i and hence (yi; xkh i) 2 X0
too. Now, if yi 2 Ri(xkh i), we immediately have a contradiction with the choice of xkh+1N . Otherwise,
we pick a zi 2 Ri(xkh i). Since (zi; xkh i) BBRi (yi; xkh i) 2 X0, we have (zi; xkh i)  (yi; xkh i) by (2) therefore,
(zi; x
kh
 i)  xkh+1N with the same contradiction.
Theorem 5.5. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space and each Ri be upper
hemicontinuous. Let   admit an !-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential 
with a BR-accessible subset X0  XN such that the condition

[xN 2 X0 & yN  xN ] ) yN 2 X0

holds. Then for every xN 2 XN there exists a Cournot path starting at xN and converging to the set
of Nash equilibria.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.3, we start with a nite Cournot path ending in X0. Once
there, we recursively dene a Cournot path hxkN ik in X0, picking a maximizer xk+1N = (xk+1i(k) ; xk i(k))
of  on X(k) := X0 \ Si2N(k) Xi  fxk ig, which exists for the same reasons as in the proof of
Theorem 5.2. Obviously, xk+1i(k) 2 R(xk i(k)); hence xk+1N  xkN and xk+1N 2 X0. An assumption that
x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for a cluster point of the path leads to a contradiction with the choice of xkh+1N in the
same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.5: once (yi; x
kh
 i)  x!, we must have (yi; xkh i) 2 X0 and hence
(yi; x
kh
 i) 2 X(kh).
When #N = 2, one would like to drop the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorems 5.3 {
5.5 in the same manner as in Theorem 3.6. In the last case, this is done in exactly the same way
without any problem. In the other cases, there emerges a problem with the central construction of
the Cournot path: the existence of a maximizer of  on X(k) cannot be taken for granted. The
problem can be solved by assuming that, for every i 2 N and x i 2 X i, Ri(x i) is closed in Xi. The
assumption is not innocuous, but weaker than the upper hemicontinuity. Then X(k) will be compact
and hence Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) will be applicable. In the case of Theorem 5.4, a broader
assumption will do: for each i 2 N , either X0i or every Ri(x i) (x i 2 X i) is closed in Xi. Then
X(k), dened as the product of either X0i  fxk ig or Ri(xk i)  fxk ig, will be compact and every
maximizer of  on X(k) will belong to X0.
Given correspondences Ri : X i ! 2Xi such that
; 6= Ri (x i)  Ri(x i) (5)
for every i 2 N and x i 2 X i (\admissible best responses"), we dene the admissible best response
improvement relation BABR on XN by replacing (1) with
yN BABRi xN 
 [y i = x i & xi =2 Ri(x i) & yi 2 Ri (x i)];
yN BABR xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BABRi xN ]:
We call an irreexive and transitive binary relation  on XN a restricted Cournot potential if there
are correspondences Ri : X i ! 2Xi n f;g such that (2) holds for BABR. A Cournot path is admissible
if xk+1N BABR xkN for each relevant k.
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Remark. If we dene admissible best responses by Ri (x i) := Ri(x i) for all i 2 N and x i 2 X i,
then every restricted Cournot potential is just a Cournot potential. When all best responses are
single-valued, as in Section 4, there is no other way to dene admissible best responses.
Theorem 5.6. Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3, as well as Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, remain valid if the
\Cournot potential" in each of them is replaced with \restricted Cournot potential," the assumptions
on Ri are shifted onto Ri , and only admissible Cournot paths are allowed.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
To extend Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 to games with a restricted Cournot potential, we need an additional
assumption, somewhat similar to (4):
8xN ; zN 2 XN 8i 2 N 8yi 2 Xi

[xi 2 Ri (x i) & (yi; x i)  zN ]) xN  zN

: (6)
The assumption is satised, e.g., if  can be represented by a function P : XN ! R in the sense that
yN  xN () P (yN ) > P (xN ), and if Ri (x i)  Argmaxyi2Xi P (yi; x i)  Ri(x i).
Theorem 5.7. Let each Xi in a strategic game   be a compact metric space. Let   admit an !-transi-
tive and lower semicontinuous restricted Cournot potential  such that each Ri is upper hemicontinuous
and (6) is satised. Then for every x0N 2 XN there exists an admissible Cournot path starting at x0N
and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given x0N 2 XN , we recursively dene a Cournot path hxkN ik in X0 in a way similar to the
proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 5.3. Given xkN 2 X0, we dene N(k) := fi 2 N j xki =2 Ri(xk i)g and
X(k) :=
S
i2N(k)
 Ri (xk i)fxk ig. IfN(k) = ;, xkN is a Nash equilibrium, and we are already home.
Otherwise, we pick a maximizer xk+1N = (x
k+1
i(k) ; x
k
 i(k)) of  on X(k), which exists because X(k) is
compact. By denition, we have xk+1i(k) 2 Ri(k)(xk i(k)), hence xk+1N BABR xkN , hence xk+1N  xkN .
Supposing, to the contrary, that x!i =2 Ri(x! i) for a cluster point of the path, we argue similarly
to the proof of Theorem 5.3. First, we pick yN for which yN BABRi x!N , obtaining yN  x!N and
hence (yi; x
kh
 i)  xkh+1N . Second, if yi 2 Ri (xkh i), then (yi; xkh i) 2 X(kh) and we immediately have
a contradiction with the choice of xkh+1N . Otherwise, we pick a zi 2 Ri (xkh i) and obtain the same
contradiction, applying (6) with xN := (zi; x
kh
 i) [2 X(kh)], yi as is, and zN := xkh+1N .
When #N = 2, we can drop the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorem 5.7, demanding
instead that every Ri (xkh i) is closed in Xi.
6 Games with structured utilities
A game with structured utilities (and additive aggregation) may have an arbitrary nite set of players
N and arbitrary sets of strategies whereas the utility functions satisfy certain structural requirements.
There is a set A of processes and a nite subset i  A of processes where each player i 2 N
participates (given exogenously). With every  2 A, an intermediate utility function is associated,
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' : XN() ! R, where N() = fi 2 N j  2 ig. The \ultimate" utility functions of the players are
built of the intermediate utilities:
ui(xN ) :=
X
2i
'(xN()); (7)
where i 2 N and xN 2 XN . Dening P : XN ! R by
P (xN ) :=
X
2A
'(xN()); (8)
we immediately see that P is an exact potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996):
P (xN ) =
X
2i
'(xN()) +
X
2Ani
'(xN()) = ui(xN ) +Qi(x i)
for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN ; clearly, it is a Cournot potential as well. If all functions ' are continuous,
then P is continuous too. If we additionally assume, e.g., each set Xi to be convex and each function
' strictly concave, then the results of Section 4 become applicable.
Remark. A strategic game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as a game
with structured utilities and additive aggregation rule (7), see Kukushkin (2007, Theorem 5).
Utility functions satisfying (7) can be found in so called \network transmission games," see, e.g.,
Facchinei et al. (2011) and references therein, which are somewhat similar to Rosenthal's (1973) con-
gestion games, but do not belong to the class. There is a directed graph with the set of links E;
each player i 2 N is assigned a path i  E in the graph (between a source and a target) and sends
a ow xi 2 [0; bi]  R along the path, getting a reward wi(xi) depending on her ow and bearing
costs
P
e2i ce(
P
j: e2j xj) depending on the total ow through each link in i. Setting A := E [N ,
i := i[fig, 'i(xi) := wi(xi) and 'e(xN(e)) :=  ce(
P
j2N(e) xj) for each e 2 E, we see that (7) holds
for each player.
The notion of a partial Cournot potential is handy in the case of a Cournot oligopoly with a linear
inverse demand function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). The strategies are Xi := [0;Ki]; the utilities,
ui(xN ) := xi maxfa  b 
P
j2N xj ; 0g Ci(xi), where a; b > 0 and C : R+ ! R+ is increasing and such
that C(0) = 0. Denoting X0 := fxN 2 XN j a   b 
P
i2N xi  0g and assuming X0 6= ; (otherwise,
there is nothing to discuss here), we easily check that X0 is both BR-closed and BR-accessible, and
the function
P (xN ) :=
X
i2N

axi   Ci(xi)
  b X
i2N
X
j2N
xixj
represents a partial Cournot potential satisfying (4) on X0. Thus, Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 are applicable.
Given continuous and strictly increasing mappings i : R! R, we may extend this approach further,
replacing (7) with
ui(xN ) = i
 X
2i
'(xN())

; (9)
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for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN . Then P (xN ) :=
P
2A '(xN()) is an ordinal potential, hence a
continuous Cournot potential again. This trick works, e.g., for the Cournot oligopoly with identical
linear cost functions (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Kukushkin, 1994): Xi := [0;Ki]; ui(xN ) := xi 
Q(
P
j2N xj)  c  xi, where Q : R+ ! R+ and c  0. Assuming fxN 2 XN j Q(
P
i2N xi)  c > 0g 6= ;
(otherwise, there is nothing to discuss here again), we may pick " > 0 such that X0 := fxN 2 XN j
Q(
P
i2N xi)   c
 Qi2N xi > "g 6= ;. It is easily checked now that X0 is both BR-closed and BR-
accessible, and the function
P (xN ) :=

Q(
X
i2N
xi)  c
 Y
i2N
xi
represents a partial Cournot potential onX0 [the logarithm of P is of the form (8)]. Thus, Theorems 5.1
and 5.5 are applicable.
A partial Cournot potential for the voluntary provision of a public good with Cobb-Douglas utilities
can be constructed very similarly.
7 Aggregative games with the single crossing conditions
A rather general (though not the most general imaginable) denition of an aggregative game sounds
as follows: each Xi is a compact subset of R, and there are mappings i : X i ! R such that
ui(xN ) = Ui(i(x i); xi)
for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN . For each i 2 N , we denote Si := i(X i)  R, and redene the best
response correspondence:
Ri(si) := Argmax
xi2Xi
Ui(si; xi):
Our assumption Ri(x i) 6= ; is equivalent to Ri(si) 6= ; for each si 2 Si.
We also assume that each player's best responses are increasing in si (in a rather strong sense):
[s0i > si & x
0
i 2 Ri(s0i) & xi 2 Ri(si)]) x0i  xi (10)
for all i 2 N and s0i; si 2 Si. The following strict single crossing condition (Milgrom and Shannon,
1994) is sucient for (10):
[x0i > xi & s
0
i > si & Ui(si; x
0
i)  Ui(si; xi)]) Ui(s0i; x0i) > Ui(s0i; xi) (11)
for all i 2 N , x0i; xi 2 Xi, and s0i; si 2 Si.
If each i is increasing in each xj , then the existence of a Nash equilibrium (but not the acyclicity
of the best response improvements) immediately follows from Tarski's xed point theorem. Novshek
(1985) was the rst to notice that the existence also obtains in the case of i(x i) =  
P
j 6=i xj ; this fact
has nothing to do with Tarski's theorem. Kukushkin (2004) proved the impossibility of Cournot cycles
in both Novshek' case and when i(x i) =
P
j 6=i xj . Dubey et al. (2006) modied a trick invented
by Huang (2002) for dierent purposes, providing a tool for the construction of a continuous partial
Cournot potential. A rather broad class of aggregative games where the trick works is described in
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Jensen (2010); the class may be the broadest possible although it is unclear how such a claim could
be proven. (The technical assumptions of Jensen's main theorem, however, should have been much
stronger.)
We describe the trick in some details for a case of intermediate generality (Kukushkin, 2005),
sucient for many applications in economics. Let
i(x i) =
X
j 6=i
aijxj ;
with aij = aji 2 R for all i 6= j. Assuming that each best response correspondence Ri is upper
hemicontinuous and satises (10), the approach of Huang-Dubey-et-al. recommends the following steps.
First, we pick a selection ri from each Ri, e.g., ri(si) := minRi(si) for every si 2 Si; then we extend ri
to the whole closed interval [minSi;maxSi] preserving its monotonicity; nally, we dene
P (xN ) :=
X
i2N
h
 xi maxSi +
Z maxSi
minSi
minfxi; ri(si)g dsi
i
+
1
2
h X
i;j2N i 6=j
aij  xi  xj
i
:
Straightforward calculations show that P (yi; x i)  P (xN ) whenever yi 2 Ri(i(x i)), and that
P (yN ) > P (xN ) whenever yN BBRi xN and xi 2 X0i :=
S
si2Si Ri(si). Therefore, P represents a
continuous partial Cournot potential satisfying (2) on X0 :=
Q
i2N X
0
i . Thus, Theorems 5.1, 5.3,
and 5.4 are applicable.
Remark. When aij  0 for all j 6= i, we have a game with strategic complementarity; when aij  0
for all j 6= i, a game with strategic substitutability. A more general situation with coecients of both
signs is also possible.
The following weak single crossing condition (Shannon, 1995),
[x0i > xi & s
0
i > si & Ui(si; x
0
i) > Ui(si; xi)]) Ui(s0i; x0i)  Ui(s0i; xi)
for all i 2 N , x0i; xi 2 Xi, and s0i; si 2 Si, ensures the monotonicity of Ri in a rather weak sense:
[s0i > si & x
0
i 2 Ri(s0i) & xi 2 Ri(si)]) [minfx0i; xig 2 Ri(si) or maxfx0i; xig 2 Ri(s0i)] (12)
for all i 2 N and s0i; si 2 Si. Since every Ri(si) is compact, (12) implies, by Theorem 3.2 from Veinott
(1989), the existence of an increasing selection ri from Ri. Dening R

i by the closure of the graph of
ri, we immediately see that R

i is upper hemicontinuous and satises both (5) and (10). In other words,
if the best responses are upper hemicontinuous and increasing in the sense of (12), while aggregation
rules i belong to the class described in Jensen (2010), i.e., allow the Huang-Dubey-et-al. trick to work,
then the game admits a partial restricted Cournot potential satisfying both (4) and (6). Therefore,
Nash equilibria exist and can be reached with admissible Cournot paths from anywhere.
8 \Counterexamples"
This section consists of examples showing the impossibility of easy generalizations.
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Example 8.1. Let us consider a game where N := f1; 2g, Xi := [0; 1] [ f2g, and the preferences are
dened by these utility functions:
ui(xN ) :=
8>>>><>>>>:
minf2xi   x i; 2xi + x i + 2g; xN 2 [0; 1] [0; 1];
1; xi = 2; x i 2 [0; 1[;
2; xi = 2; x i = 1;
xi; x i = 2:
Each utility function ui is upper semicontinuous in xN and continuous in xi; the only discontinuity in
x i happens when x i = 1 and xi = 2. The best responses are easy to compute:
Ri(x i) =
(
f2g; x i 2 f1; 2g;
f2; x i=2 + 1=2g; x i 2 [0; 1[:
There is a unique Nash equilibrium, (2; 2).
To dene a Cournot potential, we introduce an auxiliary function on R2:  (x; y) := minfx;  x+
y + 1g. Then we dene a continuous function on XN :
P (xN ) :=
(
maxf (x1; x2);  (x2; x1)g; xN 2 [0; 1] [0; 1];
2 + mini xi; otherwise:
Claim 8.1.1. If yN BBR xN , then P (yN ) > P (xN ), i.e., P represents a Cournot potential.
Proof of Claim 8.1.1. Let yN BBRi xN ; if x i = 2, we are home immediately. Let x i 2 [0; 1]; hence
xi 2 [0; 1] too, and hence P (xN )  1. If yi = 2, then P (yN )  2 > P (xN ). Let yi 2 [0; 1]; then
yi = x i=2+1=2 > x i. We have  (yi; x i) = yi > x i   (x i; yi) and hence P (yN ) = yi. Meanwhile,
 (x i; xi)  x i < yi and  (xi; x i) < yi = maxzi2[0;1]  (zi; x i); therefore, P (yN ) > P (xN ) again.
Since Ri are not upper hemicontinuous, neither Theorem 3.2, nor Theorem 3.4 is applicable here.
Indeed, a Cournot path converging to (1; 1), which is not an equilibrium, can be started from every
strategy prole in [0; 1[[0; 1[. On the other hand, Theorem 3.6 is applicable; actually, the unique Nash
equilibrium can be reached from every strategy prole after, at most, two best response improvements.
Example 8.2. Let us consider a game where N := f1; 2; 3g, X1 := X2 := [0; 1], X3 := f0; 1g, and the
preferences are dened by these utility functions: u3(xN ) := 1 if xN = (1; 1; 1), u3(xN ) := 0 otherwise,
whereas for i 2 f1; 2g, ui(xN ) := minf2xi x3 i; 2xi+x3 i+2g. Both functions u1; u2 are continuous
in xN ; u3 is upper semicontinuous in xN and continuous in x3. The best responses are easy to compute:
Ri(x i) = fx3 i=2 + 1=2g for i = 1; 2, R3(x 3) = f1g if x 3 = (1; 1), and R3(x 3) = X3 otherwise.
There is a unique Nash equilibrium, (1; 1; 1).
To dene a Cournot potential, we use the same auxiliary function on R2:  (x; y) := minfx; x +
y + 1g and dene a continuous function on XN by P (xN ) := maxf (x1; x2);  (x2; x1)g+ x3.
Claim 8.2.1. If yN BBR xN , then P (yN ) > P (xN ), i.e., P represents a Cournot potential.
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Proof of Claim 8.2.1. For players 1 or 2, the argument is the same as in the proof of Claim 8.1.1, one
only has to consider fewer cases. The situation yN BBR3 xN is only possible when y 3 = x 3 = (1; 1),
x3 = 0 and y3 = 1.
Every Cournot path started from [0; 1[[0; 1[f0g converges to (1; 1; 0), which is not an equilibrium.
Thus, the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorem 3.5, as well as the assumption #N = 2 in
Theorem 3.6, are essential.
Example 8.3. In a plane with polar coordinates (; ') (  0, 0  ' < 2), we dene a compact
subset
X :=

(; ') j 1    2	
and a mapping f : X ! X by
f(; ') :=
( 
1;minf3'=2;  + '=2g;  = 1; 
(+ 1)=2;minf3'=2;  + '=2g  =[1  log2(  1)]

;  > 1;
where  denotes addition modulo 2. Clearly, f is continuous and (1; 0) is its unique xed point.
Dening X0 := f(; ') 2 X j  = 1g and X := X nX0, we immediately see that fk(x) converges to
(1; 0) whenever x 2 X0 and to X0 whenever x 2 X.
Now we dene a strategic game: N := f1; 2g, X1 := X2 := X, ui(xN ) :=  d(xi; f(x i)), where d
denotes distance in the plane. Both utilities are continuous; the best responses are unique, Ri(x i) =
ff(x i)g. The strategy prole ((1; 0); (1; 0)) is a unique Nash equilibrium.
Then we dene a function P : X X ! R in this way:
P (x1; x2) :=
8><>:
0; 1 = 2 = 1 & '1 = '2 = 0;
mini 'i +maxi ui(xN )  2; 1 = 2 = 1 & maxi 'i > 0;
mini(1  i) + maxi ui(xN )  2; otherwise.
The function is upper semicontinuous, but not continuous.
Claim 8.3.1. If x0N BBR xN , then P (x0N ) > P (xN ), i.e., P represents a Cournot potential.
Proof of Claim 8.3.1. Let x0 i = x i and x
0
i = f(x i) 6= xi, hence ui(x0N ) = 0  u i(x0N ). If x i =
(1; 0), then P (xN ) < 0 = P (x
0
N ) and we are home.
Let  i = 1 and ' i > 0. Then 0i = 1 and '
0
i > ' i, hence P (x
0
N ) = ' i   2. If i > 1,
then P (xN ) <  2 < P (x0N ). If i = 1, then we consider two alternatives. If 'i  ' i, then
maxi ui(xN ) < 0, hence P (xN ) < ' i   2 = P (x0N ); if 'i < ' i, then P (xN )  'i   2 < P (x0N ).
Finally, let  i > 1. Then P (x0N ) = 1    i   2. If i   i, then x i 6= f(xi), hence P (xN ) <
1   i   2 = P (x0N ). If i >  i, then P (xN )  1  i   2 < P (x0N ).
We see that the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 are satised. Moreover, the potential is upper semi-
continuous, and the best responses are single-valued. Meanwhile, every Cournot path started from
XX has an innite number of cluster points besides the unique equilibrium, i.e., does not converge
to the set of equilibria. Thus, the lower semicontinuity of the potential in Theorem 3.4 is essential.
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Example 8.4. We consider a modication of Example 8.3 with the same subset X
X :=

(; ') j 1    2	
of the plane with polar coordinates and a dierent continuous mapping f : X ! X,
f(; ') :=
(
(; ');  = 1; 
(+ 1)=2; ' =[1  log2(  1)]

;  > 1;
where  again denotes addition modulo 2. Dening X0 := f(; ') 2 X j  = 1g and X := X nX0,
we immediately see that f(x) = x whenever x 2 X0, and fk(x) converges to X0 whenever x 2 X.
Now we dene a strategic game in exactly the same way as in Example 8.3: N := f1; 2g, X1 :=
X2 := X, ui(xN ) :=  d(xi; f(x i)), where d denotes distance in the plane. Again, both utilities are
continuous; the best responses are unique, Ri(x i) = ff(x i)g. The set of Nash equilibria of the game
is fxN 2 X0 X0 j x1 = x2g.
Then we dene a continuous function P : X X ! R by
P (xN ) := min
i
(1  i) + max
i
ui(xN ):
An argument similar to the proof of Claim 8.3.1, but even simpler, shows that P represents a Cournot
potential. Meanwhile, the set of cluster points of any Cournot path started from XX is the whole
set of Nash equilibria of the game. We see that the assumptions of Theorem 3.4, even Theorem 4.4,
do not ensure the convergence of every Cournot path to a Nash equilibrium.
The following example is essentially due to Powell (1973).
Example 8.5. Let us consider a game where N := f1; 2; 3g, Xi := [ 2; 2], and the preferences of each
player are dened by the same continuous utility function:
u(xN ) :=
X
i;j2N; i 6=j
xi  xj=2 
X
i2N

maxfxi   1; 0; 1  xig
2
:
Clearly, u is an exact potential of the game; hence it represents a continuous Cournot potential. Note
that the game belongs to the class considered in Section 7 with i(x i) :=
P
j 6=i xj ; the strict single
crossing condition (11) is easy to check. Note also that u is concave in each xi.
The best responses are easy to compute; given i 2 N and x i 2 X i, we denote si :=
P
j 6=i xj .
Ri(x i) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
f2g; si  2;
f1 + si=2g; 0 < si  2;
[ 1; 1]; si = 0;
f 1 + si=2g;  2  si < 0;
f 2g; si   2:
There are two Nash equilibria maximizing the utility/potential: (2; 2; 2) and ( 2; 2; 2). (0; 0; 0) is
also a Nash equilibrium.
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Fixing an arbitrary  2]0; 1=4[, we consider a sequential Cournot path starting at x0N := (1 +
4; 1   2; 1 + ): x1N = ( 1   =2; 1   2; 1 + ); x2N = ( 1   =2; 1 + =4; 1 + ); x3N = ( 1  
=2; 1 + =4; 1   =8); x4N = (1 + =16; 1 + =4; 1   =8); x5N = (1 + =16; 1   =32; 1   =8);
x6N = (1 + =16; 1   =32; 1 + =64). Comparing x0N and x6N , we see how the path will continue ad
innitum. Thus, it has six cluster points: (1; 1; 1), ( 1; 1; 1), ( 1; 1; 1), ( 1; 1; 1), (1; 1; 1), and
(1; 1; 1), none of which is an equilibrium.
We see that Theorem 3.4 cannot be extended to n > 2, while Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 are wrong
without the uniqueness of the best responses.
Example 8.6. Having in mind the same set X := f(; ') j 1    2g and mapping f : X ! X as
in Example 8.4, we consider a strategic game with N := f1; 2; 3g, X1 := X2 := X, X3 := [0; ], and a
common utility function of all players
ui(xN ) := P (xN ) :=  minfd(x1; f(x2)); d(x2; f(x1))g+minf1  1; 1  2g+
x3 
 
 ('1; '2)  jx3    ('1; '2)j

;
where
 ('1; '2) := maxfminf'1; '2; 2   '1; 2   '2g  ; 0g;
and 0 <  < =2. Clearly, P is continuous, and represents a Cournot potential of the game.
When x3 = 0, the best responses of players 1 and 2 are the same as in Example 8.4: R1(x 1)

x3=0
=
ff(x2)g andR2(x 2)

x3=0
= ff(x1)g. Therefore, the set of cluster points of any Cournot path such that
x03 = 0, 
0
1 > 
0
2 > 1, x
2k+1
N BBR1 x2kN and x
2k+2
N BBR2 x
2k+1
N is fxN 2 XN j 1 = 2 = 1; '1 = '2; x3 = 0g.
The utility function u3(xN ) is piecemeal-quadratic in x3 and it is easily checked that it strictly increases
when x3   ('1; '2) and strictly decreases when x3   ('1; '2); therefore, R3(x1; x2) = f ('1; '2)g.
Thus, we see that the best responses along the Cournot path, as well as at every cluster point, are
unique. Moreover, the path is totally inclusive since xk3 2 R3(xk 3) whenever  ('k1; 'k2) = 0, which
happens an innite number of times. However, not every cluster point is an equilibrium (only those
points where  ('1; '2) = 0). In other words, Theorem 3.4 cannot be extended to #N > 2 even under
the uniqueness of the best responses.
Example 8.7. Let us add one more player to Example 8.6, and one more additive term to the common
utility function. Thus, N := f1; 2; 3; 4g, X1 := X2 := X, X3 := X4 := [0; ], and
ui(xN ) := P (xN ) :=  minfd(x1; f(x2)); d(x2; f(x1))g+minf1  1; 1  2g+
x3 
 
 ('1; '2)  jx3    ('1; '2)j

+ x4 
 
 ('1; '2)  jx4    ('1; '2)j

;
where X, f ,  and  are the same as in Example 8.6, whereas
 ('1; '2) := maxfminfj'1   j ; j'2   jg  ; 0g:
Again, P is continuous and represents a Cournot potential of the game.
When x3 = x4 = 0, the best responses of players 1 and 2 are again the same as in Example 8.4:
R1(x 1)

x3=x4=0
= ff(x2)g and R2(x 2)

x3=x4=0
= ff(x1)g. Therefore, every Cournot path such that
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x03 = x
0
4 = 0, 
0
1 > 
0
2 > 1, x
2k+1
N BBR1 x2kN and x
2k+2
N BBR2 x
2k+1
N has the same set fxN 2 XN j 1 =
2 = 1; '1 = '2; x3 = x4 = 0g as the set of cluster points. Similarly to the preceding example,
R3(x 3) = f ('1; '2)g and R4(x 4) = f ('1; '2)g.
Again, the best responses along the totally inclusive Cournot path, as well as at every cluster
point, are unique. However, there is no equilibrium among the cluster points of the path because the
equalities  ('1; '2) = 0 and  
('1; '2) = 0 are incompatible. In other words, Theorem 4.5 would be
just wrong for #N > 3.
9 Concluding remarks
9.1. !-transitivity of a Cournot potential alone ensures the \transnite convergence" of every Cournot
path to Nash equilibria; a formal exposition can be found in Kukushkin (2010). The concept might
seem exotic, but there is something to it. If, e.g., we replace all Xi = [ 2; 2] in Example 8.5 with
arbitrary nite subsets, retaining the same common utility function, then every Cournot path will
reach an equilibrium in a nite number of steps. Therefore, one can argue that the problem illustrated
by the example is just an artefact of the suboptimal way to introduce innity: the behavior of transnite
dynamics is much closer to what happens in a nite model.
9.2. It is worth stressing once again: None of the results of this paper needs a numeric potential;
moreover, in each of the \counterexamples" in Section 8, there is a numeric potential, which does not
help. The upper semicontinuity of a Cournot potential does not ensure any better properties of best
response dynamics than just !-transitivity. And a continuous Cournot potential also seems not to have
any advantage over an !-transitive and lower semicontinuous one.
9.3. Similarly to the preceding remark, a \best-response potential" (Voorneveld, 2000) gives no ad-
vantage over a Cournot potential as dened here. The only dierence is that the continuity of a
best-response potential implies the upper hemicontinuity of all best response correspondences, hence
Theorem 3.5 absorbs Theorem 3.6, and Examples 8.1 or 8.2 become impossible.
9.4. If the Cournot potential in Lemma 4.1 is continuous, then each ri will be continuous too. Under
the actual assumptions of the lemma such a claim would be wrong.
9.5. Theorem 2 of Jensen (2010) is neither weaker, nor stronger than any result of this paper. It es-
tablishes the convergence of sequential Cournot ta^tonnement to Nash equilibria under an assumption
concerning paths were the players consecutively replace one best response with another. The assump-
tion is automatically satised if all best responses are single-valued, in which case our Theorem 4.4 is
a bit stronger. It is worth noting that Example 8.2 shows Jensen's theorem to be, strictly speaking,
wrong (upper semiconinuity of utility functions is not enough).
9.6. If we modify the constructions of Section 6, replacing the sum in (7) with the minimum, cf.
Germeier and Vatel' (1974), then the leximin ordering on XN will be a potential in the sense of
(2) for coalition improvements, hence a Cournot potential as well. Since the ordering is not lower
semicontinuous, our main results are inapplicable even though no counterexample is known. Funnily,
aggregative games of Section 7 with i(x i) = minj 6=i xj for all i 2 N or i(x i) =  minj 6=i xj for
all i 2 N also admit !-transitive Cournot potentials. And the existence of a lower semicontinuous
(partial) Cournot potential in every such game also remains neither proven, nor disproved so far.
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9.7. The Cournot path leading nowhere in Example 8.5 needs a carefully chosen initial point. It does
not matter here since the only objective of the example is to demonstrate the invalidity of straight-
forward extensions of Theorems 3.4 and 4.4. Powell (1973) also provides a more complicated example
where such paths can be started from every point in an open subset.
9.8. Most likely, Example 8.6 can be modied so that only one cluster point will be an equilibrium (
in the denition of  should depend on 1 and 2). However, this is hardly important for anything.
A much more intriguing question is whether Theorem 3.4 would still be wrong for #N > 2, and
Theorem 4.5 for #N > 3, if all best responses were assumed to be single-valued everywhere. The
constructions of Examples 8.6 and 8.7 seem not to allow an appropriate modication.
9.9. Everything in this paper is about games with ordinal preferences. For applications of the idea
of potential games to the best responses in the context of cardinal utilities, see, e.g., Morris and Ui
(2004).
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